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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past several decades Congress has sought to eliminate
discrimination in the workplace through a series of statutes that impose
liability on employers for their discriminatory employment practices!
* Professor of Legal Studies, University of Georgia. B.S. 1961, M.B.A. 1966, Louisiana
State University; J.D. 1971, Loyola University, New Orleans.
1. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination against women with respect to wages); Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994) (protecting persons age 40 and over from discrimination based on age); Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-795 (1994) (prohibiting disability-based discrimination);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (prohibiting
discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities on the basis of disability); Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.) (modifying and strengthening protections of Title
VII, ADA and other statutes); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-19,
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Courts have struggled for almost as long to define the exact contours of
this legislation in order to carry congressional intentions into practice.

Because a company only can act through its employees, it has been
almost universally accepted by courts that Congress intended for
employers to be liable for the discriminatory conduct of their agents.2
Absent vicarious liability, the victim of employment discrimination
would have recourse only against the discriminating actor in his or her
individual capacity-a result that, in most cases, would foreclose any
meaningful relief for the victim and, therefore, do little to actually deter
workplace discrimination.
Oddly enough, one of the questions currently dividing courts is
whether agents who discriminate can be held liable in an individual
capacity ("supervisor liability") under the current legislative scheme.
Most of the circuit courts which have faced the question of supervisor
liability thus far have concluded that agents cannot be held individually
liable.3 A substantial number of courts and commentators, however,
have reached the opposite conclusion, pointing to the dual purposes of
compensation and deterrence embodied in anti-discrimination statutes.4

Because most claims under federal anti-discrimination statutes are
brought directly against the employer, the issue of supervisor liability
has arisen in relatively few cases so far. The question of personal

2651-54 (1994) (protecting against discrimination on basis of need for family and medical
leave).
2. The Supreme Court has observed: "[C]ourts have consistently held employers liable
for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the
employer knew, should have known, or approved of the supervisor's actions." Meritor Say. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a
supervisor is not individually liable under Title VII); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55
F.3d 1276, 1279 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a supervisor is not individually liable under ADA);
Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a supervisor is not
individually liable under Title VII); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995)
(stating that supervisors are not individually liable under ADEA or Title VII); Birbeck v. Marvel
Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510-11 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a supervisor is not individually liable under ADEA); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that a supervisor is not individually liable under Title VII); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991
F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that a supervisor is not individually liable under ADEA
or Title VII); Sauers v. Salt Lake City County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that
a supervisor is not individually liable under Title VII).
4. See, e.g., Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 E2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
a supervisor may be an employer under Title VII), rev'd in part on other gmunds, 900 F.2d 27
(4th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir. 1986)
(stating that individuals may be held liable under Title VII and § 1981); Dreisbach v. Cummins
Diesel Engines, Inc., 848 F Supp. 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that a supervisor may be
individually liable under Title VII).
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liability has generated new interest, however, with the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 CRA)5 which makes compensatory and
punitive damages available in certain cases involving intentional
discrimination. 6 As employers scramble to defend themselves against
compensatory and punitive damages, the resulting assault on vicarious
liability will undoubtedly force the issue of personal liability into the
spotlight and require courts to determine exactly what role individual
liability is to play in the enforcement of federal employment discrimination laws.
Although imposing liability on both the employer entity and the
supervisor actually responsible for the discrimination may indeed deter
individuals from engaging in such conduct while expanding the sources
from which a victim could recover, other policy considerations,
particularly the inherent conflict between vicarious and personal liability,
counsel against holding supervisors individually liable for their
discriminatory actions. This Article explores the debate surrounding
supervisor liability under federal employment discrimination statutes,
focusing primarily on the conflicting policy arguments which will likely
play a greater role in resolving this issue than the ambiguous language
and virtually nonexistent legislative histories of the statutes themselves.
Part II addresses the federal anti-discrimination statutes individually and
the approaches taken by various courts in analyzing the issue of
supervisor liability under each statute. Part Ill attempts to weigh the
competing policies that bear on the issue of supervisor liability and
concludes that holding supervisors personally liable for their actions is
counterproductive to the goal of eradicating discrimination in the
workplace. Finally, Part IV of this Article calls on Congress to create
a uniform statutory approach to supervisor liability in order to prevent
well meaning courts from inadvertently undermining the exclusive
protections afforded by federal law to victims of employment discrimination.

5. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
6. The 1991 Civil Rights Act amends "Title VII and the ADA to permit recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(a)(2) (1994). The statute places caps on the amount of damages recoverable, ranging from
$50,000 to $300,000 depending on the size of the employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994).
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II. THE STATUTES

A. Title VII
The issue of supervisor liability has thus far arisen most often under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 which prohibits employers
from discriminating against individuals on the basis of "race, color,
religion, sex or national origin."' The Act defines an "employer" as "a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees ...

and any agent of such a person."9 It is this "agent"

language which lies at the heart of the debate over personal liability for
supervisors. Only "employers" are prohibited from discriminating and,
thus, only statutorily defined employers can be held liable under Title
VII. Courts upholding supervisor liability read the inclusion of "agents"
in Title VII's liability section as indicating a desire to hold agents
individually liable for their own discriminatory acts."° Those opposing
this liability, on the other hand, contend that this language is simply a
codification of the respondeat superior doctrine included to ensure that
employers would be held vicariously liable for the acts of their
agents." While neither of these interpretations finds express support in
Title VII's legislative history, both positions draw convincingly from the
statutory language and policies reflected in Title VII.
The courts which oppose supervisor liability under Title VII reject
the "plain meaning" approach urged by proponents as inappropriate
given that the agent language contained in the definition of employer is
capable of more than one meaning. 2 In support of their position,
opponents of supervisor liability point to the fact that this agent
language has generally served as the basis for holding employers
vicariously liable for the acts of their agents under Title VII. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has agreed that by using the term "agent" in the

7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
8. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
9. Id. § 2000e(b).
10. See, e.g., Jones, 789 E2d at 1231 ("[The law is clear that individuals may be held
liable... as 'agents' of an employer under Title VII."); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co.,
858 F. Supp. 802, 805-06 (C.D. Ill. 1994) ("the law of agency recognizes individual liability for
agents.... [I]ndividual employees may be held liable under Title VII."); Lamirande v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 834 F Supp. 526, 528 (D.N.H. 1993) ('The plain language of Title VII
clearly impose [sic] individual liability upon 'any agent of and 'employer."').
11. See, e.g., AIC, 55 3d at 1281 ("[The actual reason for the 'and any agent' language
in the definition of 'employer' was to ensure that courts would impose respondeat superior
liability upon employers for the acts of their agents."); Miller, 991 E2d at 587 (stating that the
obvious purpose is to impose respondeat superior liability on employers).
12. See, e.g., AIC, 55 F3d at 1281; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
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statutory definition of employer, "Congress wanted courts to look to
agency principles for guidance in th[e] area" of employer liability.13 It
is true that courts have universally adopted the view that Title VII
incorporates the vicarious liability doctrine of respondeat superior14

which makes a master liable for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment." Recognition that Title
VII's use of "agent" was intended to incorporate the principle of
respondeat superior alone, however, does not entirely resolve the issue
of personal liability for agents. At common law, agents are individually
liable for their own torts notwithstanding the fact that their employers
also might be held vicariously liable. 6 Title VII claims are not
common-law claims, 7 however, and the issue of supervisor liability
must, therefore, turn on whether Congress intended Title VIi's definition
of employer to create only a vicarious liability scheme or also to impose
individual liability on agents themselves." Congress' intent, however,
is not easy to discern and as a result, there isa judicial split of authority
with each side claiming to uphold congressional will.
1. Opponents of Supervisor Liability
Courts which have rejected the imposition of supervisor liability find
congressional support for this view from four main areas. First, the
limited definition of an "employer" under Title VII is incongruous with
supervisor liability. 9 Second, the administrative requirements of Title
VII are most appropriate when applied to business entities rather than
individuals."2 Third, the remedial scheme of Title VII makes more
sense when there is no supervisor liability.2' Finally, the legislative
history
of the Title is entirely silent on the issue of supervisor liabili22
ty.
13. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
14. See, e.g., id. at 70-71 (noting that courts have routinely applied vicarious liability
principles to hold employers liable under Title VII).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958).
17. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (recognizing that "common law [agency] principles may

not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII").
18. At least one court has relied on the "and any agen' language used in Title VII's
definition of "employer" as a basis for rejecting supervisor liability. 'The use of the conjunctive
word 'and,' as opposed to the disjunctive word 'or,' supports the argument that Congress merely
intended to incorporate respondeat superior into the statute." Johnson v. Northern Indiana Pub.
Serv. Co., 844 F. Supp. 466, 469 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 23-26.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 27-30.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 31-40.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 41-53.
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The courts which have rejected supervisor liability under Title VII
have done so primarily by reading the Act's agent provision in
conjunction with other language in the statute that indicates a lack of
desire on the part of Congress to hold agents individually liable for their
discriminatory actions.' Perhaps the strongest argument against
supervisor liability is found in Title VII's "employer" definition itself.
By excluding employers with fewer than fifteen employees from Title
VII's coverage,24 Congress sought in part to protect small businesses
from the costs associated with litigation and complying with the many
administrative requirements of Title VIIY In light of these concerns,
it is, in the words of the Ninth Circuit, "inconceivable that Congress
intended to allow civil liability to run against individual employees."26
Similarly, the administrative requirements imposed on employers
under Title VII lend support to the conclusion that the agent language
was included in the definition of "employer" for the purpose of
codifying respondeat superior rather than extending liability to agents in
their individual capacity.27 Section 709(c) requires every employer to
keep certain records of its employment practices." Section 711 also

23. See, e.g., Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). As originally enacted, the 1964 Act applied only to
employers with 25 or more employees. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §
701(b), 78 Stat. 241, 253. The 1964 Act was amended in 1972 to expand its coverage to those
employers with fifteen or more employees. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(2), 86 Stat. 103, 103.
25. See AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281 ('That limitation struck a balance between the goal of
stamping out all discrimination and the goal of protecting small entities from the hardship of
litigating discrimination claims."); Birbeck, 30 F.3d at 510 (recognizing that purpose of similar
provision in the ADEA "can only be to reduce the burden of ADEA on small businesses").
26. Miller, 991 E2d at 587. This reasoning has been widely followed by other courts. See,
e.g., Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 882 F. Supp. 1529, 1532 (E.D. Pa.
1995); Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp. 1232, 1237 (D.N.J. 1994); Saville v.
Houston County Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512, 1524 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
27. See, e.g., Clara J. Montanari, Supervisor Liability Under Title VII: A "Feel Good"
JudicialDecision, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 351, 361-62 (1996) (arguing use of "employer" throughout
Title VII is inconsistent with supervisor liability).
28. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 709(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (1994). Section 709(c)
states, in pertinent part:
[E]very employer.., subject to this subchapter shall (1) make and keep such
records relevant to the determinations of whether unlawful employment practices
have been or are being committed, (2) preserve such records for such periods, and
(3) make such reports therefrom, as the [Equal Opportunity Employment]
Commission shall prescribe by regulation or order.... The Commission shall, by
regulation, require each employer.., subject to this subchapter which controls an
apprenticeship or other training program to maintain such records as are reasonably
necessary to carry out the purpose of this subchapter, including, but not limited to,
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requires employers to post notices of Title VII's provisions in the
workplace and provides penalties for the failure to do so. 9 If an agent
is an "employer" for purposes of Title VII's liability provision, it would
seem to follow that an agent is also an employer for all other purposes
where that term is used. While an individual supervisor could certainly
be expected to keep records of his own employment practices, a
supervisor obviously cannot be held responsible for not posting notices
on his employer's property. In fact, the language of Section
71 1-"[e]very employer... shall post.., upon its premises... a notice"-clearly indicates that this notice requirement is aimed at entities,
not individual supervisors. °
Opponents of supervisor liability also look to the original remedial
provisions of Title VII as supporting the view that individual supervisors
are not proper parties for liability under Title VII. Section 706(g)
provides for the enjoinment of unlawful practices and "such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay... 7931
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue, the
majority of lower courts have interpreted section 706(g) as providing
only for equitable relief; that is, this provision has been construed as
excluding compensatory and punitive damages.32 Reinstatement and
hiring are remedies that only the employer entity itself can provide.

a list of applicants who wish to participate in such program, including the
chronological order in which such applications were received, and shall furnish to
the Commission, upon request, a detailed description of the manner in which
persons are selected to participate....
Id. § 2000e-8(c).
29. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 711, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (1994). Section 711 states, in

pertinent part:
(a) Every employer.., shall post and keep posted in conspicuous places upon its
premises where notices to employees, applicants for employment, and members are
customarily posted a notice to be prepared or approved by the Commission setting
forth excerpts from or, summaries of, the pertinent provisions of this subchapter
and information pertinent to the filing of a complaint.
(b) A willful violation of this section shall be punishable by a fine of not more
than $100 for each separate offense.

Id. § 2000e-10.
30. Id. § 2000e-10(a) (emphasis added).
31. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994).
32. See, e.g., Jones, 789 E2d at 1232. The 1991 CRA's addition of compensatory and
punitive damages to Title VII would seem to endorse this reading of § 706(g). See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981a(a)(1) (1994).
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Although backpay is certainly a form of damages that could be imposed
directly on individual agents, the language of section 706(g) was
borrowed from the National Labor Relations Acte 3 under which agents
had not been held personally liable for backpay. Because the relief
initially available under Title VII was interpreted to include only
remedies that were outside of an individual agent's capacity to provide,
most courts have been fairly comfortable concluding that Congress did
not intend for agents to be held personally liable under Title VII."
As proponents of supervisor liability are quick to point out, the
punitive and compensatory damages made available under Title VII by
1991 CRA are the types of remedies for which individual agents could
be held responsible.3" Those that refuse to recognize individual liability
under Title VII respond that nothing in the 1991 CRA or its legislative
history supports the view that damages were expanded under Title VII
for the purpose of creating individual liability for supervisors.36 Rather,
the fact that Congress chose to cap punitive damages based on the size
of the employer suggests quite the opposite." Caps on punitive

33. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) states that an employer engaged
in unfair labor practices shall "take such affirmative action including reinstatement of an
employee with or without back pay..... See also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 75 n.1 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975).
34. See, e.g., AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281; Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir.
1994); see also Friend v. Union Dime Say. Bank, No. 79 Civ. 5450, 1980 WL 227, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1980) (relying on interpretation of NLRA to reject supervisor liability under
Title VII and ADEA).
35. See, e.g., Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 R Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(allowing supervisor liability under Title VII based on addition of compensatory and punitive
damages), overruled by Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
Christopher Greer, Note, "Who, Me?": A Supervisors' Individual Liabilityfor Discrimination
in the Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1835, 1846 (1994) ("Imposing liability on such
individuals for their own acts... corresponds with Congress's desire to provide increased
remedies and protections under Title VII .... ").
36. See AIC, 55 E3d at 1281 ("It is a long stretch to conclude that Congress silently
intended to abruptly change its earlier vision [as to liability] through an amendment to the
remedial portions of the statute alone."); Smith v. Capitol City Club, 850 F Supp. 976, 980
(M.D. Ala. 1994) (rejecting addition of damages as sufficient basis for inferring individual
liability); see also Montanari, supra note 27, at 365-68 (finding no basis in legislative history
of 1991 CRA for inferring congressional intent to hold agents individually liable under Title
VII).
37. The limits imposed on damages for intentional discrimination under Title VII are:
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen-
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damages were included so that awards under Title VII would bear some
logical relation to the employer's wealth and ability to pay."8 Because
a supervisor's wealth bears absolutely no relationship to the size of his
employer, imposing liability on supervisors would result in the illogical
possibility that a supervisor for a large company could be saddled with
higher punitive damages than the owner of a smaller business.39 If
Congress intended to impose liability on supervisors, it would make
little sense to use the employer's size as the measure of damages. By
tying punitive damages to the employer's size, opponents of supervisor
liability argue, Congress implicitly acknowledged that such damages
would be imposed only on business entities and business owners.'
The courts that read the agent language in Title VII's definition of
employer as merely incorporating vicarious liability rely on the fact that
there is no mention of individual liability for agents in the legislative
histories of either the original Act or its several amendments. 4' Considering the extent of the debates surrounding the impact that Title VII
would have on businesses, it is reasonable to presume that Congress
would also have discussed the Act's effect on individual supervisors if
Congress had intended or anticipated supervisor liability.42 Moreover,
where the term "employer" is used throughout the debates, it most often
dar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of
20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 73 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 611
(noting that greater punitive damages should be assessed against larger and wealthier employers).
39. The private plaintiff took an even more ridiculous position in AIC, suggesting that
because § 1981a(b)(3) only addresses employers with 15 or more employees, Congress intended
no cap at all on individual liability for damages under the 1991 CRA. See AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281
n.6. The court rejected this argument. See id.
40. See, e.g., AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 n.2; Saville, 852 F. Supp. at
1524.
41. See, e.g., Grant,21 F3d at 653 (reasoning that absence of supervisors in Title VII's
list of potential defendants indicates intent to exclude individual supervisors from liability where
nothing in statute or legislative history suggests otherwise and Congress specifically included
individuals among those to be held liable in other civil rights statutes such as § 1983); Miller,
991 F.2d at 587-88 n.2 (noting that if Congress sought to impose individual liability under Title
VII Congress would have made reference to individuals in the damages provisions of 1991
CRA).
42. For a discussion of the legislative histories of Title VII and the 1991 CRA and the
absence of any reference to individual liability for supervisors, see Montanari, supra note 27,
at 360-67.
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connotes a business entity rather than an individual.43 While it is
indeed the statutory definition of "employer" that is central to the issue
of supervisor liability, it is nonetheless significant that nothing in
Congress' use of the term "employer" during Title VII legislative
debates suggests an intent to hold supervisors individually liable as
employers under the Act.
Congress' failure to explain what exactly it intended by including
"agent" in Title VII's definition of employer may, as several courts have
suggested," be explained by the relationship between Title VII and the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).45 The NLRA's definition of
"employer," which includes "any person acting as an agent of an
employer,"46 was a direct response by Congress to the perceived
inadequacies of the original language of the Act, which had defined an
employer to include any person "acting in the interest of an employer. ' 47 Under the earlier version employers were held liable for the
actions of employees who had acted outside the scope of their duties.48
Simultaneously, it also was conceivable that this language would permit
an employer to escape liability for the actions of an employee on the
theory that the employee had not acted in the employer's interest.49
Thus, by modifying the NLRA to include "agents," Congress made clear
its intent to incorporate the ordinary rule of agency law which makes
employers liable for the actions of employees acting within the actual
or apparent scope of their authority.' While courts accordingly have
interpreted the agent language of the NLRA as providing for vicarious
liability, courts also have long interpreted the limited remedies available
under the NLRA as precluding individual liability for agents.5' Because

43. See id. at 363-65 (enumerating uses of term "employer" throughout debates that are
inconsistent with any congressional intent to apply that term to individuals).
44. See, e.g., Friend, No. 79 Civ. 5450, 1980 WL 227, at *4 (recognizing that "and any
agent" language of Title VII was borrowed from NLRA under which agents are not held
individually liable). But see Bridges,800 E Supp. at 1180 (imposing individual liability without
reference to Friend), overruledby Tomka v. Seiler Corp. 66 3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995).
45. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
46. Id. § 152(2).

47. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2, 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935).
48. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1947
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1135, 1137 ("ITihe Board has on numerous occasions held an employer
responsible for the acts of subordinate employees and others although not acting within the scope
of any authority from the employer, real or apparent.").
49. See 93 CoNG. REC. 6858-59 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft).
50. See id. at 6859 ('This restores the law of agency as it has been developed at common
law.") (statement of Sen. Taft).
51. See Gary W. Florkowski, Personal Liability Under Federal Labor and Employment
Laws: Implicationsfor Human Resources Managers, 14 EMP. REL. L.J. 593, 594 (1989) (noting
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Title VII was enacted against the well established backdrop of the
NLRA and adopted not only its agent language but also its remedial
provisions, many courts find the absence of any reference to individual
liability in Title VII's legislative history unremarkable; having incorporated the NLRA's liability scheme into Title VII, Congress simply did
not anticipate that individual liability for agents would ever be an issue
under Title VIIo52
2. Proponents of Supervisor Liability
Although the courts which have opposed liability for supervisors
have strong arguments in their favor, those which uphold this type of
liability are not without support. In an attempt to show that Congress
intended supervisor liability under Title VII, these courts rely on three
primary arguments. Initially, the plain language of the statute is broad
enough to include liability for individuals as well as business entities.53
In addition, imposing supervisor liability would promote the twin policy
goals of Title VII.' Finally, inclusion of punitive and compensatory
damages in the remedial scheme of Title VII is evidence that individuals
and businesses would be held responsible under the statute. 55
Proponents of individual liability for supervisors also are not at all
troubled by the absence of any reference to individual liability in the
legislative histories of Title VII or its subsequent amendments.
Legislative history, is after all, a method of determining congressional
intent where such intent is not discernible from the statutory language
itself. Thus, the lack of any indication that Congress intended otherwise
favors giving the definition of "employer" its plain meaning." Because
that definition includes "any agent of such a person," agents are
statutorily defined employers and are according to supporters of
individual liability, therefore, parties to whom liability attaches under
Title VIIY Moreover, proponents argue, this agent language would be

that although NLRA's language could be interpreted to support individual liability, courts "have
reflected little willingness to adopt this perspective").
52. See, e.g., Friend, No. 79 Civ. 5450, 1980 'WL 227, at *4 (drawing on NLRA's
legislative history to reject individual liability under Title VII and ADEA).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 56-59.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 60-65.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 66-70.
56. See, e.g., Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 667 (10th Cir. 1995).
57. See, e.g., Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (reading
definition of "employer," which includes agency language, as enumeration of liable parties),
rev'd in parton other grounds, 900 E2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Jones, 789 F.2d at 1231
C'mhe law is clear that individuals may be held liable for violations of § 1981, and as 'agents'
of an employer under Title VII.") (citations omitted).
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redundant if read merely as making an employer liable for the conduct
of its agent.5" Because an employer entity, such as a corporation, can
only act through its agents, common law agency principles would
impose liability on employers for the acts of their agents even absent the
agent language in Title VII. Thus argue proponents of supervisor
liability, Congress' decision to define agents as employers only makes
sense if read to impose individual liability on agents as statutorily
defined employers.59
The argument most often put forth in support of imposing Title VII
liability on individual supervisors is that doing so would further Title
VII's twin goals6 of eliminating employment discrimination6 and
compensating victims of such discrimination.62 Placing liability directly
on individual supervisors who discriminate against their subordinates
seems to be a fairly effective way of pressuring supervisors not to
engage in such activity. While the effectiveness of Title VII obviously
depends on encouraging business entities to monitor their employment
practices and prevent discrimination on the part of management,63 the
fear of individual liability would provide an additional and necessary
check against insufficient or insincere monitoring by the business
entity.' Moreover, in today's mobile workforce, many management
personnel are more likely to respond to the threat of a lawsuit than to
the threat of a reprimand from their employer. Individual liability also
would provide the victim of discrimination with an additional party
against whom to seek recovery. Although conventional wisdom suggests
that full recovery is more likely to come from a business entity than a
potentially judgment-proof supervisor, in situations such as the entity's
58. See, e.g., Ball, 54 F.3d at 667.
59. See id.
60. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421 (noting that the "central statutory purposes" of
"eradicating discrimination" and "making persons whole.., for past discrimination").
61. See, e.g., Garcia v. ELF Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that deterrence requires "hold[ing] liable those with power over the plaintiff which
exceeds that of mere co-workers"); Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1986)
(reasoning that not imposing individual liability "would encourage supervisory personnel to
believe that they may violate Title VII with impunity").
62. See, e.g., Johnson v. University Surgical Group Assocs., 871 F Supp. 979, 986 (S.D.
Ohio 1994) (concluding that expanded liability is more consistent with goal of making plaintiff
whole than limiting those against whom plaintiff can recover); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant
Hosp., 824 F Supp. 769, 785-86 (N.D. 11. 1993) (noting that individual liability would be only
avenue for relief where employer entity has gone bankrupt).
63. This simple truth is apparent in Congress' decision to impose liability under Title VII
on employers rather than persons.
64. See, e.g., Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1012
(N.D. I11.1994) (suggesting that employers "more often than not" fail to discipline supervisors
even after a jury finds that the supervisor discriminated).
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bankruptcy or dissolution, relief would be foreclosed unless the victim
could recover directly from the individual supervisor.65
Supporters of individual liability also look upon the compensatory
and punitive damages added to Title VII by the 1991 CRA as indicative
of an intent to make agents liable for their own conduct.' Not only are
these tort-like remedies the kind that individuals can be expected to
pay,67 as between the employer entity and the discriminating agent,
fairness favors imposing liability on the more culpable party." Even
under the common law, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not
absolve an agent of liability or prevent a victim from proceeding
directly against him.6 Similarly, proponents contend, interpreting the
agent language in Title VI's definition of employer literally so as to
create individual liability for agents is not only not at all inconsistent
with Congress' intent to codify respondeat superior, but also makes the
most efficient use of the deterrent and penal aspects of damages. 0
B. The Age Discriminationin Employment Act
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)71 makes it
unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any an individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-

65. See, e.g., Vakharia, 824 . Supp. at 785-86.
66. See, e.g., Bridges, 800 F.Supp. at 1180, overruled by Tomka v. Seller Corp., 66 F.3d
1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995); Greer, supra note 35, at 1846-47.
67. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining that equitable relief initially
available under Title VII led many courts to conclude that only employers and not individuals
were liable under Title VII).
68. See Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimination by Managers and Supervisors:
Recognizing Agent Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 589 (1994)
('[B]lameworthiness theory of tort liability also requires that victims be allowed to sue agents
who discriminate [under Title VII].").
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958).
70. This view is supported by Congress' desire to strengthen Title VII through the 1991
CRA which states:

The Congress finds that(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful
harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace;
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful
discrimination in employment.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991).
71. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
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ment, because of such individual's age.... "72 When originally passed
in 1967, the ADEA borrowed its definition of "employer" from Title
VII with minor differences related only to the size of the employers that
fell within the Act's coverage. 73 Thus, under the ADEA, an employer
is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has twenty or more employees... [and] any agent of such a person. . . ."14 The similarities between the employer definitions in the
ADEA and Title VII have led most courts and commentators to analyze
the issue of supervisor liability in the same manner under both Acts.75
Because the ADEA borrowed its enforcement provisions not from Title
VII, but from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),76 however, several courts and commentators have relied on the parallels between
the ADEA and the FLSA as a basis for distinguishing
between Title VII
7
and the ADEA for purposes of individual liability. "
The FLSA, which defines "employer" to include "any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee,"' has long been interpreted by courts as imposing personal
liability on individual supervisors.79 Because the Supreme Court has
noted that the specific and selective incorporation of the FLSA's remedy
and procedural provisions into the ADEA evidenced a congressional
intent to adopt existing interpretations of those provisions into the
ADEA, 0 some courts have extended the FLSA's imposition of personal
liability on supervisors as "employers" to the ADEA despite the very
different definitions of "employer" used in each statute. 8' For these
courts, the ADEA's incorporation of the FLSA's enforcement scheme
is more important in unraveling the issue of supervisor liability under
the ADEA than its definition of "employer" which, although borrowed

72. Id. § 623(a)(1). The protection under this statute is limited to individuals who are at
least 40 years of age. Id. § 631 (a).
73. Compare id. § 630(b) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
75. See, e.g., AIC, 55 E3d at 1279-80; Birkbeck, 30 3d at 510-11; Miller, 991 F.2d at
587-88; Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 874 R Supp. 192, 194 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
76. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
77. See, e.g., House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 R Supp. 159, 160-62 (M.D.N.C. 1988);
Miller, 991 F.2d at 589-90 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1994).
79. See, e.g., Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1983);
Hodgson v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 324 F. Supp. 342, 347 (N.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd, 465 F2d
473 (5th Cir. 1972); Shultz v. Chalk-Fitzgerald Constr. Co., 309 F Supp. 1255, 1257 (D. Mass.
1970).
80. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582 (1978).
81. See, e.g., Miller, 991 E2d at 589 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); House, 713 F. Supp. at
161-62.
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from Title VII, is viewed at best as ambiguous with regard to individual
liability for agents.
The courts which read the ADEA as imposing supervisor liability
also have relied on the fact that the remedial scheme of the ADEA is
much broader than that of Title VII as originally enacted. Prior to the
1991 CRA, damages were not available under Title VII; rather, relief
under Title VII was originally limited to equitable remedies such as
reinstatement and backpay s2 The ADEA, on the other hand, provided
from its inception for liquidated damages in cases involving willful
violations."3 Thus, while the remedies once available under Title VII
were arguably not the type of relief that supervisors could be expected
to provide,84 the same was not true of the ADEA. Noting this distinction, several courts have reasoned that while Title VIIs limited remedial
scheme might very well suggest that Congress did not intend for
supervisors to be held individually liable under Title VII, the ADEA's
broader scope of relief is much more consistent with the imposition of
individual liability.85 For these courts, the additional fact that the
ADEA's damages provision was borrowed directly from the FLSA,
which holds supervisors directly liable for their own conduct, is
conclusive evidence of a congressional intent to create a similar liability
scheme under the ADEA.86
Those courts which have refused to hold supervisors individually
liable under the ADEA have rejected the ADEA-FLSA comparisons and
have drawn instead on the similarities between the ADEA and Title
VIIY Although Congress borrowed the ADEA's remedy and procedural provisions from the FLSA, Congress did not similarly adopt the
FLSA's definition of "employer" but instead modeled the ADEA's
liability provision on the agent language found in Title VII.8 Thus,
these courts reason, reliance on FLSA case law should be limited to
those provisions that were specifically incorporated into the ADEA. 9
In other words, Congress could have easily adopted the FLSA's
definition of "employere' so as to make clear its intent to incorporate the

82. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39 (describing original remedial scheme of Title

VIH).
83. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40 (explaining link made by courts between
Title VII relief provisions and congressional intent regarding individual liability for
supervisors).
85. See, e.g., Miller, 991 F.2d at 589 (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting); House, 713 F Supp. at 160.
86. See, e.g., Miller, 991 F.2d at 589 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); House, 713 R Supp. at 160.
87. See, e.g., Miller, 991 F.2d at 588 n.3.
88. See, e.g., id.
89. See, e.g., id.
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FLSA's liability scheme into the ADEA. Instead, Congress chose to
borrow Title VII's definition of "employer" which was in turn modeled
on the NLRA. 9 Whereas liability under the FLSA "is predicated not
on the existence of an employer-employee relationship" but on an
individual's willful conduct in relation to the employee, 91 the NLRA
has long been understood to hold employers vicariously liable for the
conduct of their agents but not to impose individual liability on the
agents themselves.92 Therefore, if Congress' adoption of the FLSA's
enforcement provisions is viewed as an intent to incorporate the existing
interpretations of these provisions into the ADEA, Congress' use of the
employer definition found in the NLRA and Title VII must similarly be
understood as a conscious decision not to make agents individually
liable under the ADEA.93
The courts that reject supervisor liability under the ADEA because
of its similarity to Title VII are not bothered by the fact that the two
statutes vary in their scopes of relief. While the ADEA provides for
liquidated damages that are not available under Title VII, the ADEA and
Title VII are now much closer in terms of the relief they provide as a
result of the 1991 CRA, which has made compensatory and punitive
damages available under Title VII.9 Thus, the original remedial
differences between the ADEA and Title VII are no longer (if indeed
they ever were) viewed by courts as a proper basis for distinguishing
between the two statutes with regard to liability.95 Additionally, in
drafting the 1991 CRA, Congress limited the damages available under
Title VII by reference to employer size without mentioning individuals
or discontinuing Title VII's exemption for small employers.96 Because

90. See supra text accompanying notes 45-52 (explaining link between Title VII and

NLRA).
91. Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 740 F. Supp. 127, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting
Shultz v. Chalk-Fitzgerald Const. Co., 309 F. Supp. 1255, 1257 (D. Mass. 1990)).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 49-61 (describing legislative history of NLRA and
its impact on Title VII case law).
93. See, e.g., Miller, 991 F.2d at 588 n.3 (refusing to apply FLSA liability scheme to
ADEA where ADEA did not incorporate relevant FLSA provisions); Bridges, 800 F. Supp. at
1180 (interpreting Title VII liability provision by reference to ADEA), overruled by Tomka v.
Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994) (permitting recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages in cases of intentional discrimination under Title VII).
95. See, e.g., Miller, 991 F.2d at 588 n.3 (stressing that as a result of CRA 1991 "the
liability schemes under Title VII and the ADEA are essentially the same in aspects relevant to
th[e] issue [of relief]"). But see id. at 589 n.1 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (contending that "ADEA
still affords more expansive relief possibilities" than Title VII given damages caps applicable
under Title VII).
96. See supra note 37 (setting forth Title ViI's damages provision as amended by 1991
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this damages scheme suggests that Congress did not intend to make
agents individually liable for damages under Title VII, these courts
reason, the prior availability of similar damages under the ADEA does
not, by itself, indicate that Congress intended to hold agents individually
liable under the ADEA.97 Rather, for these courts, Congress' treatment
of damages under Title VII reinforces the conclusion that the agent
language of Title VII and the ADEA should be interpreted in the same
way-namely, as precluding individual liability for agents.98
C. The Americans with DisabilitiesAct
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)99 forbids a
"covered entity" from discriminating in regard to employment decisions
against qualified individuals with disabilities. 1" A "covered entity" is
defined under the statute as "an employer, employment agency, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee."'' 1 An "employer," in turn, is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or more employees.., and any agent of such
person."'" Although enacted in 1990,"0 the ADA did not become
effective until July 1992°' and as a result, has thus far generated few
judicial opinions directly addressing supervisor liability. It is proper to
assume, however, that most courts will analyze the issue of individual
liability in the same manner under both statutes because the ADA's
definition of "employer" mirrors the language found in Title VII."

CRA).
97. See, e.g., Miller, 991 F2d at 587-88.
98. See id. Although this reasoning is sound, it also could be argued that by capping
damage under Title VII but not the ADEA, Congress was seeking to draw further distinctions
between their enforcement schemes rather than expressing an intent to treat individuals the same
under both Acts.
99. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
100. More specifically, the Act states that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id.§
12112(a).
101. Id. § 12111(2).
102. Id. § 12111(5)(A).
103. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327.
104. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 108, 104 Stat. at 337.
105. Compare AIC, 55 F.3d at 1282 (rejecting supervisor liability under ADA) and
Williams v. Banning, 72 E3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting supervisor liability under Title
VII) with Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1010 (recognizing supervisor liability under ADA) and
Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 784 (recognizing supervisor liability under Title VII). See also supra
pt. II.A. (explaining courts' treatment of individual liability under Title VII).
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Unlike the ADEA, which adopted Title VII's "employer" definition
but borrowed its enforcement provisions from the FLSA, the ADA also
adopted its remedy and procedural provisions directly from Title
VII. °" Accordingly, courts routinely have relied more heavily on Title
VII case law when interpreting the ADA than when interpreting the
ADEA.'" Therefore, while the availability of liquidated damages
under the ADEA has been viewed by some courts as a justification for
imposing individual liability under the ADEA,'" the absence of similar
damages under the original version of the ADA will likely lead courts
to reject Title VII case law and individual liability under the ADA on
the theory that by providing only for equitable remedies that employer
entities could grant, Congress did not intend to extend liability to
agents. 9
As in the Title VII context,"' both opponents and supporters of
supervisor liability under the ADA point to the changes wrought by the
1991 CRA as endorsing their positions. Proponents of supervisor
liability contend that in adding compensatory and punitive damages to
the remedies available under the ADA, Congress included damages that
individuals could be expected to pay so as to make clear its intent that
agents should be held directly liable under the ADA."' Opponents, on
the other hand, look to the fact that the 1991 CRA caps damages by
employer size as evidence that Congress did not intend to extend
liability to individuals who would otherwise be exposed to unlimited
liability under this scheme."' Although the ADA became effective
only after the 1991 CRA was passed, the ADA was enacted prior to the
1991 CRA."3 Thus, as in the case of Title VII, most courts probably
will reject the notion that Congress sought to silently alter the ADA's
definition of "employer" by simply amending its remedial provisions
through the 1991 CRA."4
106. See AIC, 55 F.3d at 1280 n.1.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 86-98 (explaining courts' use of ADEA-FLSA link
as basis for distinguishing Title VII precedent when addressing supervisor liability under
ADEA).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 86-98.
109. See, e.g., AIC, 55 .3d at 1281 (rejecting supervisor liability under ADA in part
because available remedies are only type obtainable from employer entity); see also supra text
accompanying notes 31-34 (explaining courts' reliance on Title VII's limited equitable relief as
basis for rejecting supervisor liability).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40, 66-70 (describing impact of 1991 CRA on
debate over supervisor liability under Title VII).
111. See, e.g., Jendusa, 868 F Supp. at 1015.
112. See, e.g., AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281.
113. Id. at 1281 n.5.
114. Id.
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D. The Family Medical Leave Act
The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA)..5 requires
covered employers to provide "eligible" employees with up to twelve
weeks of unpaid leave per year when the employee is unable to work
because of a "serious health condition""' 6 and prohibits employers
from discriminating against or otherwise interfering with the rights of
individuals under the Act.'17 "Employer" is defined under the FMLA
as "any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity
affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees,"". but also
includes "any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of
an employer to any of the employees of such employer... ."9 This
latter language was modeled on that contained in the FLSA, which has
long been interpreted as imposing individual liability on supervisors."
While FMLA's minimum employee threshold could be read as 21a
rejection of individual liability as is done in the Title VII context,
Congress' decision to borrow the FLSA provision rather than Title VII's
"agent" language has led most courts to follow FLSA case law and hold
supervisors individually liable under the FMLA as well."
E. Sections 1981 and 1983
Sections 1981 and 1983 establish statutory causes of actions for
certain violations based on the United States Constitution. Because
section 1981 and section 1983 are viewed as creating statutory torts,'2
115. See Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. & 29
U.S.C.).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (1994). The FMLA also mandates employee leave for the
birth or adoption of a child and for purposes of giving care to an immediate family member with
a serious health condition. See id. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(C).
117. See id. § 2615.
118. Id. § 2611(4)(A)(i).
119. Id. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I).
120. See, e.g., Brocke v. Hamad, 867 F.2d 804, 808 n.6 (4th Cir. 1989); Donovan v.
Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st Cir. 1983).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31 (explaining inconsistency between holding
individuals liable and excusing small businesses from statutory commands); see also Frizel v.
Southwest Motor Freight, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 441, 449 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (relying on similarities
between FMLA and Title VII as justification for rejecting individual liability under FMLA).
122. See, e.g., Waters v. Baldwin County, 936 F. Supp. 860, 863 (S.D. Ala. 1996);
Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D. Md. 1996); Johnson v. A.P. Prods., Ltd., 934
F Supp. 625, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Freemon v. Foley, 911 F. Supp. 326, 332 (N.D. Ill. 1995);
see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) 1998) (Department of Labor regulation stating that individuals
acting in interest of employer are individually liable under FMLA).
123. See, e.g., A1-Khazraji v. St. Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 518 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd,
481 U.S. 604 (1987).
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the circuit courts have applied general tort principles to these statutes.
Thus, in contrast to the federal anti-discrimination statutes specific to the
employment context, it is fairly well established that individuals can be
held personally liable under section 1981 and section 1983." Although section 1981 and section 1983 reach much farther than the mere
employer-employee relationship, these statutes merit a brief discussion
here because they are applicable to certain types of employment
discrimination.
Section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in the
formation and enforcement of contracts." Because even at-will
employment is a contractual relationship," section 1981 provides a
private cause of action for both public and private sector employees 27
who are subjected to race-based discrimination in the workplace.
Although section 1981 and Title VII are for the most part interchangeable in cases involving race-based discrimination," section 1981

124. See, e.g., Jones, 789 F2d at 1231 (stating that individuals may be held liable under
§ 1981); AI-Khazraji, 784 E2d at 518 (holding that individuals may be held liable under §
1981); Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 E2d 740, 748 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that § 1981 "is
aimed at rectifying individual acts of discrimination"); Faraca v. Clements, 506 E2d 956, 959
(5th Cir. 1975) (holding that an individual may be held liable under § 1981). Cf. Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 690-91 (1978) (holding that a municipality qualifies as
a person under § 1983 and may be held liable).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). The statute provides:
(a) Statement of equal rights.
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishments, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined.
For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes
the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment.
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
Id.
126. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74 (1984) ("Mhe contract of
employment may be written or oral, formal or informal; an informal contract of employment
may arise by the simple act of handing a job applicant a shovel and providing a workplace.").
127. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
128. In response to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1989), which
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differs from Title VII in several important aspects. Most significant for
purposes here, while Title VII is usually interpreted as imposing liability
only on employers and not their agents,129 individual supervisors can
be held directly liable under section 1981."3 Additionally, whereas
Title VII's coverage is limited to employers with fifteen or more
employees,' there is no minimum number of employees required to
trigger section 1981's application. Section 1981 also extends to all
contractual relationships and thus, unlike Title VII, applies to partnerships and subcontractor relationships.'
Perhaps more important for
the supervisor who faces personal liability, damages under section 1981
are not subject to any caps such as those applicable under Title VI.' 33
Despite these and other advantages over Title VII') section 1981 is
not utilized as often as Title VII to challenge race-based discrimination
in the workplace.
Section 1983 creates a statutory cause of action for infringements of
constitutional rights under color of state law.'35 Although with regard

severely restricted the degree of overlap between § 1981 and Title VII, Congress added
paragraphs (b) and (c) to § 1981 through the 1991 CRA so as to make clear that § 1981 reaches
as far as Title VII with regard to the terms and conditions of employment. See H.R. REP. No.
102-40(i), at 89-93 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 627-31; see also Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72.
129. See supra note 3 (listing courts which have rejected supervisor liability under Title
VII).
130. See, e.g., Jones, 789 F.2d at 1231; AI-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 518, aff'd, 481 U.S. 604
(1987); Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 E2d 740,748 (7th Cir. 1985); Faraca,506 E2d at 959.
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
132. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 169-74 (1976).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39 (explaining that although damages are
capped under Title VII, damages against supervisors might be unlimited because the caps
arguably do not apply or would be based on the size of the supervisors' employers).
134. Because there is no federal agency charged with enforcing § 1981, those bringing §
1981 claims do not have to jump through the many procedural hoops required for Title VII
claims. Moreover, plaintiffs probably are not required to exhaust state remedies as a precondition
to bringing their § 1981 suits. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982)
(rejecting exhaustion requirements in § 1983 cases in large part because § 1983, like § 1981,
arose from Civil Rights Act of 1871).
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, [or]
suit in equity....
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to employment discrimination there is a great deal of overlap between
section 1983 and the other anti-discrimination statutes discussed here,
the protections offered by section 1983 are at once both broader and
narrower than its counterparts. In addition to gender, race, age and
disability-based discrimination, for instance, section 1983 potentially
reaches all discrimination, including that based on weight, ethnicity,
political views and sexuality.136 Because constitutional analysis applies
to claims brought under section 1983, however, the degree of protection
afforded by section 1983 is very different from that provided by other
anti-discrimination statutes. For example, under section 1983, employment practices which discriminate on the basis of race are subjected to
strict scrutiny, the most demanding test applied by courts. 37 Age-based
employment decisions, on the other hand, are shown much greater
deference and require only a rational relation to the ends sought to be
achieved in order to survive attack under section 1983.3
While these varying degrees of scrutiny explain to some extent why
section 1983 is seldom used to challenge employment discrimination
that falls within the ambit of other statutes, the more obvious reason is
that section 1983 only applies to discrimination by persons acting under
the color of state law: state actors. 39 "Persons" within the meaning of
the statute include all natural persons and, thus, individual supervisors
are subject to personal liability under section 1983."4 Public officials,
however, often can escape liability for damages under the public-official
immunity doctrine.' Nonetheless, for the victim of discrimination
136. See, e.g., Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that military's
discrimination based on individual's status as admitted homosexual violates equal protection);
Dahl v. Secretary of Navy, 830 . Supp. 1319, 1337 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (finding military
restriction on homosexuals violative of equal protection).
137. Cf. Boutros v. Canton Reg'l Transit Auth., 997 F.2d 198, 202-03 (6th Cir. 1993)
(explaining the elements of § 1983 action for national origin discrimination); Trautvetter v.
Quick, 916 E2d 1140, 1149 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing when sexual harassment violates equal
protection under § 1983); Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1315 (5th Cir. 1980)
(describing plaintiff's burden of proof for § 1981 racial discrimination claim).
138. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); see also
Hatten v. Rains, 854 F.2d 687, 692 n.7 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that while Equal Protection
Clause provides little protection from discrimination on basis of age, elderly are not without
protection by referring to congressional enactment of ADEA).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
140. Cf. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. Legal persons such as municipalities and other local
governments are also liable under § 1983 but only for their acts as entities; vicarious liability
does not apply under § 1983. See id. at 690-91, 694. In contrast to municipalities, states
themselves are immune from suit in federal court under § 1983 as a result of the Eleventh
Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).
141. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,247-48 (1974) (recognizing immunity depending
on "scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they
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who is able to mount a section 1983 claim successfully, doing so may
be preferable to pursuing the same claim under Title VII or the ADA
because money damages are not subject to any caps under section
1983.142
III. THE POLICY ARGUMENTS
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the question of whether
agents should be personally liable under federal anti-discrimination
statutes is a complicated one not easily resolved by reference to
principles of statutory construction alone. While statutory language itself
does not readily provide the answer, neither do the legislative histories
of the various statutes nor their historical underpinnings shed definitive
light on what Congress intended with respect to individual liability. The
search for a solution, therefore, must include a careful examination of
the often conflicting policies reflected in these statutes and the impact
supervisor liability would have on their effectiveness in eliminating
workplace discrimination. While at first glance the twin goals of
deterrence and compensating victims would seem to support extending
liability to supervisors in their individual capacity, imposing such
liability would, in all likelihood, result in less protection for victims of
employment discrimination in the long run.
Contrary to the position taken by several courts and commentators,
however, the policy arguments made in support of individual liability
are not so easily dismissed.143 Imposing liability on supervisors for
their own conduct would indeed expand the sources of recovery
available to victims of employment discrimination1" and in the case
of the bankrupt company, might provide the only source of compensation.145 Individual liability also would increase the deterrent effect of
reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based"). In the
context of employment discrimination, the protection enjoyed by public officials is generally

limited to a qualified immunity. See id. The barrier to recovery created by qualified immunity
is much lower where only equitable relief is sought against a public official. See, e.g., Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n.18 (1985); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 537-38 (1984).
142. If supervisors are individually liable under Title VII and ADEA, the issue of damage
caps is still problematic because the 1991 CRA caps damages based on the number of
employees. Thus, damages against a supervisor may be based on the size of that supervisor's
employer or may in fact be unlimited because the caps arguably do not apply. See supra text
accompanying notes 35-40 (describing debate over 1991 CRA's damages provision).
143. See, e.g., AIC, 55 F.3d at 1282 (recognizing value of the increasing number of
potential defendants so as to increase deterrence and encourage suits in marginal cases but
rejecting individual liability nonetheless as inconsistent with the balance struck by Congress
between omni-liability and societal costs).
144. See Johnson, 871 R Supp. at 986.
145. See, e.g., Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 784-86.
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anti-discrimination statutes in many cases. As is evident from the
existing case law, not all employers are diligent in monitoring discrimination and punishing the inappropriate conduct of supervisors." Even
if this were not the case, common sense suggests that in at least some
circumstances, the mere threat of being reprimanded by their employer
will not be sufficient to force agents to modify their behavior. 47 In
these situations, imposing individual liability may be the only way to
combat discrimination in the workplace.
On the other hand, individual liability for supervisors is not nearly
as critical to achieving the goals of deterrence and compensation as
some proponents suggest. 148 Even where the fear of disciplinary action
by the employer is insufficient to prevent inappropriate behavior, an
employer who is held vicariously liable for the conduct of its agent can
sue the agent at common law for breach of the duties of care and
loyalty.' 49 Statutory liability for agents, therefore, is not truly necessary
as a financial deterrent to prevent agents from discriminating against
their subordinates. Juries also may be more reluctant to attach liability
or award adequate damages when the defendant is an individual than
when the defendant is an employer entity. Thus, the availability of
supervisor liability may reduce the likelihood that victims as a group
will be fully compensated for their injuries.
The only situation in which a successful plaintiff might otherwise be
foreclosed from recovering under federal anti-discrimination statutes
absent individual liability is where the employer entity has dissolved or
is in bankruptcy." In many such cases, the victim still may be able
to recover from the principles of the entity under the corporation law
concept of veil-piercing.' Even where recovery from the entity or its
principles is not available, the inability to bring an action directly

146. See, e.g., Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1012 (noting that even after a jury finds that a
supervisor discriminated, the employer "more often than not" fails to reprimand the supervisor).
147. For instance, supervisors who are highly valued by their employer, qualified for
pensions, or already planning to leave the employer may have little fear of being reprimanded.
See id. at 1012 n.8.
148. See, e.g., id. at 1012 (describing monetary penalty as "essential" to deterring
discriminatory conduct of supervisors).
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 399 (1958).
150. See, e.g., Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 784-86.
151. In appropriate circumstances, veil-piercing would enable the victim to recover from
the owners of the dissolved or bankrupt entity in their personal capacities. See, e.g., White Oak
Coal Co., 318 N.L.R.B. 732, 732 (1995) (concluding that piercing the corporate veil is appropriate where "(1) the shareholder and corporation have failed to maintain separate identities, and
(2) adherence to the corporate structure would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or lead to an
evasion of legal obligations"); see also Saville, 852 . Supp. at 1525 (leaving open the possibility of supervisor liability where employer is bankrupt or corporate veil-piercing is necessary).
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against an individual supervisor under anti-discrimination statutes does
not automatically foreclose all prospects of recovery for the victim.
Actions under state law152 and, in certain cases, section 1981 and
section 1983' often will allow victims to pursue claims against
individuals that cannot be brought under Title VII or its companion
statutes.
Moreover, even if federal anti-discrimination laws provided the sole
basis for recovery, imposing individual liability on agents would do little
to solve the problem posed by the bankrupt entity. These agents, who
are most likely to be only mid-level managers and perhaps even jobless
as a result of their employers' bankruptcy, often will themselves be
judgment proof. While it is true that not every individual supervisor will
file bankruptcy in order to avoid a judgment, this seems as, if not more,
likely than the employer going bankrupt in the first instance. In short,
holding supervisors individually liable for damages under anti-discrimination statutes rarely will be necessary to compensate fully the victim
of discrimination and where it is "necessary," the imposition of
supervisor liability is unlikely to achieve this goal.
Although the threat of personal liability would certainly deter some
inappropriate conduct on the part of supervisors that cannot be prevented
merely by imposing vicarious liability on their employers, individual
liability is likely to result in an overall net decrease in statutory
compliance. The fear of personal liability and of simply having to
defend oneself against charges of discrimination will create enormous
pressure on supervisors to avoid making or implementing personnel
decisions adverse to those viewed as likely candidates for filing
discrimination charges."5 The foreseeable result of individual liability,
therefore, is that supervisors as a group would be more, not less,
inclined to make employment decisions based on statutorily protected
characteristics such as race, sex, and age.
Although it could be argued that such "overcompensation" already
occurs to some degree under a scheme where only the employer entity
itself is exposed to liability, the danger of overcompensation is not

152. Any number of contract and tort theories, such as interference with contract rights and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, may be available to challenge conduct that would also
fall under the rubric of federal anti-discrimination statutes. See, e.g., Saville, 852 R Supp. at
1540-42 (finding sexual harassment in workplace presented jury question on assault and battery
and invasion of privacy claims).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 123-42 (explaining overlap between § 1981 and
§ 1983 and employment discrimination statutes).
154. See, e.g., Archer v. Globe Motorists Supply Co., 833 F. Supp. 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (noting that excessive concerns with liability have chilling effect on performance and lead
to impaired efficiency).
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nearly as great as it would be if supervisors also were faced with
personal liability. Because a corporation is in the business of making
profits, its concern with efficiency and, ultimately, its bottom line
generally will prevent the corporation from hiring, promoting, or failing
to discipline an employee out of fear of discrimination claims by that
employee. Moreover, unlike the individual supervisor, a corporation
usually has the resources to determine the exact extent of its obligations
under federal anti-discrimination statutes. It is true that even if supervisors were individually liable for their own conduct, the threat of
vicarious liability would force employers to educate and monitor their
agents so as to guard against the dangers of overcompensation. If,
however, supervisors will fear individual liability more than reprisal
from their employer, as proponents of supervisor liability claim,'55 it
is also true that these same supervisors will be more concerned with
their own self-preservation than with serving the employers' interests
and bottom-line. Thus, personal liability would tend to undercut, rather
than support, the overarching purpose of federal equal opportunity policy-putting an end to employment decisions based on statutorily
protected characteristics.
Personal liability for individual supervisors also would impose the
type of financial burdens that Congress sought to avoid when it limited
the coverage of anti-discrimination statutes to employers with fifteen,' 56 twenty," and fifty 5 1 or more employees and tied damages
to employer size.159 While it is true that liability would only attach to
a supervisor if that supervisor's employer has the requisite number of
employees,"6 the size of the employer has absolutely nothing to do
with the wealth of the supervisor.' If individual supervisors who

155. See, e.g., Jendusa, 868 F Supp. at 1012 (claiming that monetary penalty is necessary
to deter supervisors from discriminating because employers will not or cannot provide adequate
disciplinary response).
156. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994); Americans with
Disabilities Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994).
157. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994).
158. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (1994).
159. See supra note 37 (quoting 1991 CRA damage provision which caps compensatory
and punitive damages by employer size for purposes of Title VII and ADA).
160. Only employers with the requisite number of employees are subject to the statutes'
prohibitions. Thus, even if "agents" are treated as statutorily defined "employers" for purposes
of liability, only those agents of entities which satisfy the threshold number of employees could
be held liable under the statutes. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Verde v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F. Supp. 1329, 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("A
corporation's ability to pay can be estimated by its size and the number of its employees; an
individual's ability to pay cannot be estimated by the size of his employer."). This, of course,
would not be true where the agent is in fact the alter ego of the employer entity, i.e., the owner
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discriminate are to be held personally liable, why should liability be
limited only to those who work for entities employing a certain number
of people? Moreover, why should a supervisor who works for a large
company face greater exposure to damages than one who works for a
smaller firm? Whatever purpose Congress sought to achieve by limiting
liability and damages in reference to an employer's size simply cannot
by imposing individual liability on the agents of employbe served
62
ers.

1

Of the many policy reasons that counsel against imposing personal
liability on agents, the one most often overlooked by courts is the very
real risk that doing so consequently will reduce employers' incentives
to see that their agents comply with federal anti-discrimination statutes.
Rather than prohibiting persons from discriminating as it has done in
other contexts, 63 Congress chose to enforce its employment discrimination statutes by attaching liability only to statutorily defined employers. This choice reflects a recognition on the part of Congress that
employers are in the best position to ensure that statutory demands are
met"'4 and to provide the remedies necessary to cure the effects of
discriminatory employment practices. 65 Supervisor liability threatens
to undermine the vicarious liability scheme which forms the core of
federal employment discrimination policy because extending liability to
agents in their individual capacities is likely to reduce the amount of
damages and liability to which employers are exposed.
Individual liability would weaken the deterrent effects of vicarious
liability if courts, viewing both the employer entity and its agent as
proper parties for liability, begin to apportion damages between the two.
While at common law joint tortfeasers were jointly and severally liable
for damages, the modem trend has been to allow contribution so that

of the company. Even so, individual liability would not be necessary in this case to make the
agent/owner feel the impact of a damage award because any damages assessed against the entity
by virtue of vicarious liability will necessarily be felt by its owner. See AIC, 55 E3d at 1282
n.8. Additionally, where the agent is the alter ego of the entity, corporate veil-piercing would
prevent the agent/owner from escaping liability in many cases. See supra note 151 and
accompanying text (describing requirements for piercing corporate veil).
162. This point has led many courts to reject individual liability. See, e.g., Birkbeck, 30
F.3d at 510; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; Barb v. Miles, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 356, 359 (W.D. Pa.
1994); Saville, 852 R Supp. at 1524.
163. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). See also supra notes 139-40 and accompanying
text (describing scope of "persons" under § 1983).
164. See Miller, 991 E2d at 588 ("An employer that has incurred civil damages because
one of its employees believes he can violate Title VII with impunity will quickly correct that
employee's erroneous belief.").
165. See Grant, 21 E3d at 653 (stressing importance of equitable relief such as
reinstatement in remedying workplace discrimination).
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each party is liable only for his share of damages." In states which
follow apportionment, the common-law treatment of damages is usually
only modified where the joint tortfeasers are each directly liable for the
injury, not when one of the parties is merely vicariously liable for the
tort of another. 67 Although liability for employers under Title VII and
its companion statutes is based on vicarious liability, several courts
extending individual liability to agents have nevertheless ruled that
apportioning damages between the employer and agent is proper."
None of the federal anti-discrimination statutes specifically provide
for apportionment of damages. 6 9 However, apportionment seems
particularly likely given that one of the principle arguments made in
support of individual liability is that the agent who actually discriminates is more blameworthy than the employer and should be liable for
damages. 7 ° Although this reasoning is certainly appropriate in other
contexts,' its application to liability for employment discrimination
would allow an employer to avoid at least a portion of damages
whenever the discrimination could be attributed to one or more of its
agents. Additionally, because punitive damages are available only in
cases involving intentional discrimination,"7 apportionment and its
emphasis on blameworthiness might well enable employers to escape
punitive damages altogether. 73 The likely impact of apportionment,

166. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 50,
at 336-38 (5th ed. 1984).
167. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 1998); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note
166, § 52, at 346 (noting that no rationale exists for applying apportionment to situations
involving vicarious liability).
168. See, e.g., Jendusa, 868 F. Supp. at 1016 (ADA); Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 E2d 439,
445 (5th Cir. 1986) (Title VII).
169. See Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94-95 (1981)
(holding that no right to contribution exists under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act).
170. See, e.g., Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 416, 424 (D.N.J. 1994); Strzelecki v.
Schwarz Paper Co., 824 . Supp. 821, 829 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
171. Under general agency principles, an employer held vicariously liable for the actions
of its agent can usually seek indemnity from the agent. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 166, §
51, at 341-42.
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994).
173. At least one employer has already made this argument, although unsuccessfully. See
Preston v. Income Producing Management, 871 E Supp. 411, 413-15 (D. Kan. 1994). But see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1958) (stating employer vicariously liable for
punitive damages only if employee was employed in managerial capacity and acted within scope
of his employment); Mitchell v. Keith, 752 E2d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusing to hold
employer vicariously liable for punitive damages under § 1981 unless discriminating supervisor
was at managerial level). See also infra text accompanying notes 181-86 (explaining possibility
that employer entities may be able to escape vicarious liability for damages altogether under
1991 CRA).
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therefore, would be to relieve much of the pressure that encourages
employers to prevent their agents from engaging in discriminatory
conduct. At the very least, because individual supervisors are more
prone to being judgment-proof than employers, apportionment of
damages will reduce the chances of full compensation for the victims of
discrimination.
Far more dangerous than leading to the apportionment of damages,
however, is the possibility that individual liability for agents will cause
courts to reexamine the role of vicarious liability under federal antidiscrimination laws. Although the status of vicarious liability would
appear to be well protected at least under Title VII by the Supreme
Court's endorsement of the doctrine in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 74 the Meritor Court also stated that Congress' use of
"'agent'... surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts
of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held
responsible."175 This language, which could be read simply as an
acknowledgment by the Court that vicarious liability does not arise
simply by virtue of an employer-employee relationship,176 instead has
been used by most circuits as a basis for rejecting vicarious liability
altogether in at least one context. In cases involving hostile work
environment claims,'" courts have been particularly reluctant to hold
employers liable for the improper conduct of their agents, ruling instead
that only direct liability can attach to employers in these cases. 7 '
Although there appears to be no reason to treat vicarious liability
differently in hostile work environment cases than in other situations, 179 courts have strained to apply additional concepts, such as

174. 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).

175. Id.
176. Under respondeat superior, the employer is only liable for the torts of his servants
committed while acting "in the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (emphasis added). Thus, an employer is not automatically liable for
all of the conduct of its employees; see infra note 182 and accompanying text (defining that

conduct which is within agents' scope of employment).
177. A hostile work environment exists when unwelcome conduct of a proscribed nature
is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and
create an abusive working environment.' "Meitor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
178. See Frederick J. Lewis & Thomas L. Henderson, Employer Liabilityfor "Hostile Work
Environment" Sexual Harassment Created by Supervisors: The Search for an Appropriate
Standard, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 667, 674-75, 687-730 (1995) (surveying cases and finding that
most circuits hold employer liable only when it knew or should have known of harassment and

failed to correct it).
179. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 77 (Marshall, J., concurring) (finding "no justification for a
special rule, to be applied only in 'hostile environment' cases").
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notice and reporting requirements, to avoid imposing liability on
employers. 8 ' The recent addition of compensatory and punitive
damages to the remedies available under Title VII and the ADA may
make courts even more reluctant to hold employers vicariously liable for
the unlawful conduct of their employees. 8 '
Under a statutory scheme that relies only on vicarious liability for
enforcement, a court can avoid imposing liability on an employer for the
otherwise unlawful conduct of its employee only by determining that the
employee was not acting as an "agent" of the employer. Although
such a determination would place the conduct outside of the statute's
coverage and, therefore, leave the victim of discrimination without a
remedy under that statute, courts are not free to rewrite agency law
entirely. Thus, even a court that is reluctant to impose vicarious liability
on an employer is bound to a large degree by agency principles to hold
the employer liable for the conduct of those employees who are clearly
agents of the employer. In a world where agents are individually liable
for their own conduct, however, those courts seeking to exonerate the
employer may be inclined to rethink or even abandon vicarious liability.
Courts could allow employers to escape liability in many cases by
drawing distinctions between direct and indirect liability rather than
tinkering with the definition of "agent."18 3 While the result in these

180. See Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 E2d 178, 183-84 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting
different standards used for hostile work environment than for other types of employment
discrimination).
181. See supra note 173 (explaining hesitance of some courts to hold employers vicariously
liable for punitive damages).
182. Under agency law, an employer can only be held vicariously liable for the conduct of
an agent acting within the scope of his employment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219 (1958). An agent's conduct is within the scope of employment if "(a) it is of the kind he
is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
[and] (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master... ." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1)(a)-(c) (1958). Thus, courts unwilling to impose liability on
employers for the conduct of agents often will conclude that the agent was not acting within the
scope of his employment when the discrimination took place. This occurs particularly in cases
involving sexual harassment. See, e.g., Jackson v. Kimel, 992 F2d 1318, 1322 (4th Cir. 1993)
(noting that North Carolina courts "have consistently held that sexual harassment and similar
conduct are not in furtherance of the employer's business; rather, in most cases, the conduct is
deemed to be for the perpetrator's own licentious purposes").
183. This already has occurred in the context of hostile work environment claims where
courts have abandoned vicarious liability and imposed liability on the employer only when the
employer knew or should have known of the agents' conduct and failed to correct it; thus, only
direct liability can attach in these cases. See supra notes 177-80 (discussing separate standards
used in hostile work environment cases). Of course, vicarious liability is not always necessary
to hold an employer responsible for the action of its employees. Where the employer knows of
and fails to prevent or cure the discrimination, the employer is directly liable, not simply
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courts might be that more conduct is attributed to agents and, thus,
actionable under anti-discrimination statutes, reducing the availability of
vicarious liability would be devastating to victims of employment
discrimination.
Because individual agents are far more likely than employer entities
to be judgment proof, the victim that is only permitted to recover
against the agent may be left without much hope of a full recovery.'
Moreover, money damages are not always the appropriate remedy, and
individual agents are simply not in a position to provide the reinstatement, hiring, and promotion that may be necessary to cure the effects
of workplace discrimination. Most importantly, however, the employer
that is not faced with vicarious liability has little incentive to deter
inappropriate behavior that cannot be attributed directly to the employer
itself. Such a liability scheme would in fact encourage employers to
actually avoid discovering discrimination so as to protect themselves
from direct liability.
Even if vicarious liability were not abandoned entirely, the availability of individual liability would almost certainly lead courts to distinguish between individual and employer liability for some purposes. For
instance, the 1991 CRA states that in Title VII and ADA claims
"against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimina-

vicariously liable. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995). The
employer also will be directly liable when it endorses or ratifies the discriminatory actions of
its agents. See, e.g., Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 767 (1997).
184. A growing number of companies are purchasing "Employment Practices Liability
Insurance" (EPLI) to protect themselves from discrimination suits. Most EPLI policies cover
both the company and its individual supervisors. See Susan A. Bocamazo, Companies Buy
Insurancefor Discrimination,96 LAw. WKLY USA 335 (1996). Thus, in some cases, the victim
of discrimination that is only permitted to proceed against the supervisor still may be able to
recover something as a result of the employer's EPLI. Policy coverage, however, varies by
carrier and many EPLI policies do not cover intentional discrimination. See id. Because
compensatory and punitive damages, the only type of relief an individual supervisor could be
expected to provide, are typically only available in cases involving intentional discrimination,
see, e.g., infra text accompanying note 185, limits on EPLI coverage may still prevent EPLIs
from offering much hope of a full recovery to victims of discrimination. Moreover, many states
prohibit insurance coverage for deliberately wrongful acts altogether, see Bocamazo, supra, and
even where such coverage is permitted some policies will cover the employer for intentional acts
but not individual supervisors. See Sally Roberts, Maturing EPL Market Offering Enhanced
Cover, Bus. INS., June 9, 1997, at 14. Despite their limitations, EPLI policies are becoming
increasingly important to employers if for no other reason than that they will generally cover
defense costs even if the insurance company does not have to indemnify the policy holders. See
Bocamazo, supra.Unfortunately for many employees subjected to discrimination on the job, the
result of EPLI coverage will be that claims will be defended more vigorously without providing
a pool of funds for paying those claims that succeed.
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tion... the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive
damages ...

from the respondent."' 85 Because personal liability for

agents under these statutes must be premised on the notion that agents
are themselves statutorily defined "employers," '8 6 an employer entity
might very possibly be able to avoid vicarious liability for compensatory
and punitive damages simply by arguing that it is not the employer for
purposes of the 1991 CRA's damage provision. Although vicarious
liability is probably well enough entrenched under the employment
discrimination statutes to avoid a wholesale abandonment, supervisor
liability certainly will provide employers with fresh ammunition with
which to defend themselves against vicarious liability. The length to
which many courts have already gone to avoid holding employers liable
for the conduct of their agents guarantees that these arguments will find
more than a few sympathetic ears.
IV. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM STATUTORY
APPROACH TO SUPERVISOR LIABILrrY

Regardless of one's position on the issue, the question of whether
individual agents should be subject to personal liability under federal
anti-discrimination laws is a complex one that requires careful analysis
and a willingness to balance the legitimate needs of victims, employers,
and supervisors alike. While courts have applied themselves to the
question of supervisor liability with a great deal of earnestness and
ingenuity over the past three decades, because the resolution of this
issue must ultimately turn on public policy considerations, courts are illequipped to resolve the ambiguities surrounding Congress' intentions.
By focusing primarily on statutory language, legislative history and
other tools of interpretation, courts have not only reached conflicting
conclusions regarding the same statutes but also have read the various
anti-discrimination statutes as incorporating different liability schemes.
Thus, while a majority of circuits have interpreted the language in Title
VII as precluding individual liability for agents,'87 courts have been
more willing to allow individual liability under the ADEA"' and the
FMLA'89 based on the various differences between these statutes and

185. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (emphasis added).
186. Only "employers" are prohibited from discriminating and, thus, only if agents are
"employers" can they be held liable under the various statutes. See generally supra pt. II.
187. See supra note 3 (listing circuits which have rejected individual liability under Title

viI).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 75-86 (noting distinctions between Title VII and
ADEA and courts' inclination to treat individual liability differently under each statute).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22 (explaining courts' rationale for treating
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Title VII. Whether intended by Congress or not, the result is a statutory
scheme that exposes supervisors to personal liability for certain types of
discrimination but not for others and, therefore, sends a dangerous
message to employers, their agents, and the victims of employment
discrimination. The time has come for Congress to step forth and
declare its intentions as to supervisor liability in a less elusive manner.
Thus far Congress has prohibited employment discrimination based
191
on a range of factors-from race, gender, and religion" to age,
9
disabilities," and the need for medical leave'93 and has given no
indication that it views one of these types of discrimination as any more
or less onerous than the others. Indeed, there is no justifiable policy
reason for allowing a victim of one form of discrimination to recover
against an individual supervisor when other similarly situated victims
cannot. Conversely, a supervisor should not escape personal liability for
what is clearly unlawful discrimination merely because he or she targets
a particular victim. And yet, under the present scheme, a supervisor who
willfully discriminates against an individual on the basis of race, for
instance, is less likely to be held personally liable than if he chooses
instead to discriminate on the basis of age.
Although this situation may not actually encourage discrimination
in the workplace, it definitely sends a signal to supervisors that certain
forms of discrimination will be more tolerated than others. Moreover,
because the availability of individual liability inevitably reduces to some
degree the pressure on employers to ensure that statutory commands are
obeyed by their agents,"94 treating individual liability differently under
the various federal statutes can only lead to a situation in which certain
types of discrimination are monitored by employers less vigorously than
others. The obvious losers in both instances are the potential victims of
employment discrimination.
The courts, however, are not entirely to blame for creating a federal
anti-discrimination scheme that treats some forms of discrimination
differently than others. After all, Congress employed different language
and enforcement methods in the various statutes and has provided no
hint as to what it intended with regard to individual liability. Because
courts have little choice but to approach the issue of liability as a matter
of statutory interpretation, only Congress can address this issue with the
individual liability differently under Title VII and FMLA).
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
191. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
193. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (1994).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 162-83 (explaining how individual liability will
undermine effectiveness of vicarious liability as means of enforcing anti-discrimination statutes).
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finality and speed necessary to resolve the disparities between these
statutes that threaten to undermine the federal goal of eradicating
workplace discrimination.
In short, Congress should enact legislation so as to create a uniform
approach to individual liability under Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA,
and the FMLA. Whether Congress endorses individual liability or not,
a uniform standard would at least have the merit of treating the
proscribed forms of discrimination in the same manner. The better
solution, of course, would be to reject individual liability under all of
the statutes specific to employment discrimination so as to avoid
relaxing the pressures on employers that are so necessary to the
enforcement of these statutes." State law actions and section 1981
and section 1983 claims will remain to fill many of the gaps where
recourse against an individual supervisor is the only remedy available
to the victim of discrimination because of an employer's insolvency or
dissolution."
It is true that the availability of individual liability under state laws,
section 1981 and section 1983 is to a certain degree inconsistent with
the uniform approach to liability proposed here, but individual liability
under these laws does not pose the same problems as now exist under
the employment discrimination statutes. In the first place, state laws and
section 1981 and section 1983 exist independently of the federal
employment discrimination statutes and although applicable to
workplace discrimination, extend much farther than the employment
context. Thus, the presence of individual liability under these laws does
not detract from a system that treats all forms of employment discrimination alike for purposes of federal law.
Moreover, altering liability rules under state law and particularly
section 1981 and section 1983 would have severe impacts for other
classes of plaintiffs, and yet allowing individual liability under these
laws would not interfere with a scheme that relied solely on vicarious
liability for enforcing federal anti-discrimination policy in the
workplace. Sections 1981 and 1983 and state laws are not widely used
to challenge discriminatory employment practices." 9 Although the
inability to recover against an individual supervisor under Title VII and
its counterparts may lead to a greater reliance on alternative theories,
state laws and especially section 1981 and section 1983 are of limited

195. See id.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 123-42, 153 (explaining how state laws and § 1981
and § 1983 can be used to challenge discriminatory employment practices).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 123-42 (explaining some of reasons why § 1981
and § 1983 are of limited use to victims of employment discrimination).
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applicability and will in no way operate to supplant the federal statutes
specific to employment discrimination. More importantly though, the
presence of individual liability under state law, section 1981 and section
1983 will not weaken the deterrent effect of vicarious liability under the
federal employment statutes because employers will not be able to
predict with any certainty under which law a particular employee might
choose to pursue his or her claim. Rather, in situations where state law
and the constitutionally based actions might apply, the possibility of
individual liability under these laws would operate as an additional
deterrent upon supervisors without simultaneously relieving any of the
pressures on employers to prevent workplace discrimination as would
occur if individual liability also were accepted under the federal employment statutes. While the many complications of maintaining overlapping
and often times contradictory federal and state systems to address
employment discrimination are quite beyond the scope of this Article,
it is at least clear that a uniform approach to individual liability under
the various federal employment discrimination statutes is necessary in
order to make clear to employers, their agents, and employees alike that
all of the proscribed forms of discrimination are equally intolerable as
a matter of federal policy.
V. CONCLUSION

The issue of individual liability for supervisors under Title VII, the
ADA, the ADEA, and the FMLA must be resolved once and for all.
Holding supervisors personally liable for discrimination under these
statutes places unrealistic burdens on supervisors and provides employers with the incentive and means with which to escape the vicarious
liability which has long been the principle basis for enforcing federal
employment discrimination policy. With almost no guidance from
Congress, the courts which have struggled with the question of
individual liability have thus far failed to reach a consensus with regard
to any of the individual statutes.
Worse still, forced to treat the issue of liability as purely a matter of
statutory construction, the courts often have read the various discrimination statutes as encompassing different liability schemes. The result is
a system of federal laws which holds supervisors personally liable for
certain forms of discrimination and allows them to escape liability for
others. Such a scheme can only serve to weaken the overall goal of
eliminating discrimination in the workplace that Congress has sought to
achieve through Title VII and its companion statutes. The problems
posed by individual liability under these statutes are by no means trivial
ones that simply pit the interests of supervisors against those of victims
seeking to recover for injuries caused by discrimination. Rather, the
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question of whether or not supervisors should be personally liable for
their discriminatory conduct is integrally tied up with the basic issue of
how to best maximize the enforcement of federal anti-discrimination
policy while minimizing the social and economic costs of such a policy.
Because even well-intentioned courts are ill-equipped to strike the
necessary balance, sooner or later Congress must step forth and finally
resolve the debate over individual liability. Hopefully, Congress will
demonstrate the same wisdom it has shown in seeking to eliminate
workplace discrimination by taking the initiative sooner rather than
later and rejecting individual liability under all of the federal employment statutes.
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